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TSEDENBAL’S  MONGOLIA   AND  COMMUNIST
AID  DONORS: A REAPPRAISAL
By Balazs Szalontai Ph.D (Hungary)
During the Cold War most Western observers saw the Mongolian
Communist dictatorship headed by Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal as a puppet regime,
unable and unwilling to defend the nation’s interests against the Soviet Union.
Following the democratic transition of 1989, this narrative became widely
accepted in Mongolia as well. Recently studied Hungarian archival
documents show, however, that the Mongolian Communist leadership resented
foreign domination and made great efforts to pursue an independent economic
policy.
The popular interpretation is correct to the extent that the Mongolian
People’s Republic (MPR) was more loyal to Moscow than North Korea or North
Vietnam, and Tsedenbal considered China a greater threat to his rule (and to
Mongolia) than the USSR. Nevertheless, diplomatic reports prepared by the
Hungarian Embassy to Ulaanbaatar reveal that Soviet-Mongolian relations were
not as harmonious as the articles of Ünen, the Mongolian party newspaper,
suggested.
Diplomats affronted
In September 1960 the Communist diplomats accredited to the Mongolian
People’s Republic joined forces to lodge a formal complaint against their ill-
treatment at the hands of various Mongolian cadres. The Soviets, though
generally satisfied, found the officials of the Foreign Ministry  uncooperative.
The Hungarians complained that leaders of the mass organizations consistently
ignored their requests for meetings. The Czechoslovak embassy was so laxly
guarded that an unknown local managed to enter the ambassador’s bedroom to
ask for directions. The Poles noted that officials at the telephone exchange
deliberately hindered them in contacting Warsaw. Even an otherwise reserved
North Vietnamese diplomat complained bitterly about the recurrent shortages
of electricity and water.
The diplomats’ unfamiliarity with local customs and their patronizing
attitude toward ‘backward’ and ‘lazy’ Mongols played a role in their complaints.
However, these incidents did not result merely from cultural differences between
Mongolians and the ‘fraternal’ diplomats. They had much in common with the
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tactics that James C. Scott described in his Weapons of the Weak.  That is, they
constituted a form of subtle insubordination aimed at getting some psychological
satisfaction without running the risk of a harsh reprisal.
If this interpretation is correct, the Mongolian officials achieved their aim,
for the Hungarian diplomats, deceived by the pro-Soviet public statements
which the Mongolian leaders eagerly made, never suspected the nuisances
reflected hostility on the part of the top leadership. They blamed the incidents
on incompetent low-level officials or simply found them incomprehensible.
Mongolian tactics, however, were strikingly similar to those the Albanian and
North Korean dictatorships, famous for their dislike for Khrushchev’s policies,
used against the Soviet and East European embassies in 1953-1964. In other
words, they indicated tension between Mongolia and the Communist countries,
a tension that is worth analysing.
Weapons of the Weak
The forms of such harassment may reveal some of the Mongolian motives.
For instance, between 1960 and 1964 the Mongolian Foreign Ministry attempted
to open diplomatic mail, monitor the activity of the diplomats, subject them to
restrictive regulations and prevent embassies from employing locals not hand-
picked by the ministry. Spying on the ‘fraternal’ diplomats seems to have started
late in 1960, when the Hungarian Embassy described it as ‘a completely new
phenomenon’.1 In 1963 the Foreign Ministry instructed diplomats not to hunt
without a shooting licence, though Mongolian citizens were free to purchase
guns without licence. These measures reflected the leadership’s wishing to
demonstrate its sovereignty, at least symbolically.
The emphasis the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP)
leaders laid on Mongolian sovereignty was accompanied by efforts to protect
the dignity of the leadership and, by implication, of the nation. Aware that their
economically underdeveloped and politically dependent country was looked
down upon by leaders and diplomats of other Communist regimes, the
Mongolian leaders were touchy. As a Hungarian attaché warned a Vietnamese
colleague in 1959: ‘since the Mongolian comrades are extremely proud and
they easily take offence at trivial matters, one has to treat them with utmost care
and caution.’2
On other occasions Mongolian institutions demanded disproportionately
large sums for their services, a way for the regime to extract greater resources
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from the ‘fraternal’ countries whose economic assistance was considered
insufficient.
Mongolia’s Great Leap Forward
Anxious not to lag behind the more developed Communist countries, the
MPRP leaders wanted the USSR, China and the East European countries to
support the rapid industrialization of the MPR. Their plans were often quite
megalomaniacal. For instance, in 1959 Luvsantserengiin Tsend informed the
Hungarian Ambassador of a plan to replace the felt inside the yurts (gers) by
plastic to be produced in Mongolia; in 1960 Damdinjavyn Maidar asked the
Hungarians to construct eight- to ten-storied buildings in Ulaanbaatar; and in
1961 Tsend only half-jokingly told the East German Ambassador that the MPR
wanted to catch up with the GDR by the mid-1960s. In 1961 the vice-chairman of
the State Planning Office flatly declared that the government considered the
construction of a blast furnace in Darhan a political, rather than an economic,
issue.
If donors pointed out that planned projects, like a sugar-refining factory,
were incompatible with local economic and climatic conditions, the MPRP leaders
did not hesitate to accuse them of being unwilling to assist Mongolia. When in
1960 the Hungarian Ambassador told Tsagaan-Lamyn Dugersuren that neon
lights would not survive the Mongolian winter, Dugersuren replied: ‘Look,
Comrade Ambassador, we are interested in the neon lights, not why they cannot
be installed. If the city council of Budapest really wants to help us, then they
should rack their brains to make neon lights capable of withstanding even 50-
60 degrees of frost. This would be a really fine gift.’3
Soviet dissatisfaction with MPRP policies
The Soviet leaders criticized the regime’s disastrous rural policies, such
as the low prices paid to producers and the insufficient emphasis on the
production of hay, pointing out that these blunders resulted in high livestock
losses. These criticisms were justified as the MPRP leaders were unwilling to
invest in the rural sector at the expense of industrialization.
Still, the Mongolian leadership must have understood that Soviet criticism
was, at least partly, motivated by self-interest. The USSR wanted the MPR to
concentrate on the export of meat and minerals, which would have perpetuated
the country’s over-specialization. In September 1960 the Soviets demanded a
drastic revision of Mongolia’s Third Five-year Plan, and in the summer of 1962
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Khrushchev flatly rejected Tsedenbal’s request for additional aid. On the latter
occasion the Soviet leader, known for his peculiar diplomatic style, gave his
wristwatch to Tsedenbal, telling him that this was all what he could give to
Mongolia.
These Soviet steps aggravated the tension between the Mongolian
authorities and the Communist diplomats. In the post-1963 period the
intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict helped to improve Soviet-Mongolian
relations but also limited Ulaanbaatar’s freedom of manoeuvre. The MPRP
leaders tried to replace the constraints of Soviet-Mongolian bilateralism by
participation in larger, multilateral economic and military structures. This
motivation may have played a greater role in their expressed willingness to join
the COMECON and the Warsaw Pact than their loyalty to Moscow. In 1964
Maidar bluntly told a visiting COMECON delegation that the machines Mongolia
had received from the USSR were often outdated, an evaluation confirmed by
the East European delegates.
Conclusion
Nationalism spurred the MPRP leadership’s economic policies in the period
1959-1964, which resulted in repeated clashes with the Kremlin. The Mongolian
leaders did not merely represent the country’s economic interests as best as
they could but preferred the creation of a full-fledged, partly autarkic economic
structure over economic cooperation on the basis of mutuality.
Several MPRP leaders whose rude or demanding behaviour the Hungarian
diplomats criticized, among them Maidar and Dugersuren, survived every purge
of the 1959-1964 period and remained members of Tsedenbal’s inner circle. This
seems to confirm that their actions enjoyed at least the tacit support of
Tsedenbal. While Tsedenbal usually refrained from direct involvement in such
clashes, on some occasions he did take a stand. In 1960 he openly told the
Hungarian Ambassador that Soviet and Chinese aid was insufficient and the
East European states had to increase their economic assistance.
While in the 1960s many Mongolian intellectuals felt that rapid
modernization destroyed national traditions, the dictator and his supporters
considered Mongolia’s cultural heritage an essentially retarding influence. Unlike
Daramyn Tömör-Ochir, Tsedenbal and his inner circle did not play upon cultural
nationalism. Nor did he express an interest in pan-Mongolism or attempt to
break free from the USSR as drastically as Kim Il-sung.
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Still, the steps Tsedenbal and his supporters made in the field of economic
and foreign policy raise questions about simplistic interpretations that depict
the MPRP regime as a mindless puppet of a foreign power. While Tsedenbal’s
views did lack commitment to ethnic nationalism, they seem to have been similar
to civic, state-centred nationalism, at least in certain respects.
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